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ABSTRACT
In our nation’s immigration system, a noncitizen charged with 
deportability may be detained pending the outcome of removal 
proceedings. These individuals are housed in remote facilities closely 
resembling prisons, with severe restrictions on access to counsel and 
contact with family members. Due to severe backlogs in the 
adjudication of removal proceedings, such detention may last months 
or even years. 
Many of the noncitizens initially detained by enforcement officials 
have the opportunity to request a bond hearing before an 
administrative adjudicator called an immigration judge (“IJ”). 
Although these IJs preside over relatively formal, on-the-record 
hearings and are understood to exercise “independent judgment,” 
concerns have been raised that they are subject to control by political 
superiors in the executive branch. 
This Article analyzes approximately 780,000 custody decisions by 
IJs from January 2001 through September 2019 to explore the question 
of political influence over these adjudicators. Its bivariate analyses 
based on cross-tabulations, without additional controls, show that 
noncitizens have fared worse in bond proceedings during the Trump 
administration than they did during the prior two presidential 
administrations. Importantly, these differences were not limited to 
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decisions rendered by Trump-appointed IJs. Rather, all IJs— 
regardless of the president whose Attorney General appointed them— 
have been more likely to deny bond or impose a higher bond amount 
during the Donald Trump Era than during the Barack Obama or 
George W. Bush (“Bush II”) Eras. Although this analysis does not 
control for the myriad of demographic, political, economic, 
geographic, and institutional factors that could impact decision-
making, these findings call into question the political independence of 
IJs making decisions on noncitizen bonds. 
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INTRODUCTION
The detention of noncitizens pending deportation proceedings has 
been the subject of considerable controversy. Over the past year alone, 
the media has reported on the troubling conditions of confinement,1 
1. See, e.g., Quinn Owen, DHS Watchdog Finds ‘Egregious Violations’ at ICE Immigrant 
Detention Facilities, ABC NEWS (June 6, 2019, 2:58 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dhs-
watchdog-finds-egregious-violations-ice-immigrant-detention/story?id=63534100 [https://perma.cc/
B4P5-2LM2] (reporting on violations of government standards including spoiled food, poor 
medical care, and “standing-room-only conditions”); Ian Urbina, The Capricious Use of Solitary 
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efforts to eliminate time limits for the detention of children,2 and the 
diversion of funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”) to finance additional bed space in detention centers.3 
In the United States, a noncitizen charged with deportability may 
be detained pending the outcome of removal proceedings in 
immigration court. The immigrant detention system constitutes the 
largest single system for confinement in our nation.4 Almost 400,000 
individuals were detained in fiscal year 2018,5 and on any given day, 
facilities hold up to 47,000 noncitizens.6 Although immigrant detention 
has been characterized as civil rather than penological in nature,7 
Confinement Against Detained Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/ice-uses-solitary-confinement-among-detained 
-immigrants/597433 [https://perma.cc/425Y-4JMQ] (documenting the arbitrary use of solitary 
confinement). 
2. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Migrant Families Would Face 
Indefinite Detention Under New Trump Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/flores-migrant-family-detention.html [https://perma.cc/
AEU2-BSEE].
 3. See, e.g., Julia Ainsley & Frank Thorp V, Trump Admin Pulling Millions from FEMA
Disaster Relief To Send to Southern Border, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2019, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-pulling-millions-fema-disaster-relief 
-send-southern-border-n1046691 [https://perma.cc/GJG4-ACXZ]. 
4. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ 
odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/A924-7F7N]. 
5. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND 
REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 8 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/ 
pdf/eroFY2018Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7EY-FSSJ] (reporting 396,448 initial detentions); 
see also  KATHERINE WITSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL REPORT:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2017, at 10 tbl.5 (2019), https:// 
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3XDF-VDGJ] (reporting 323,591 initial admissions into Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) detention facilities in fiscal year 2017, from a high of 464,190 in fiscal year 2012). 
Detentions of individuals from Mexico and the “Northern Triangle” countries of El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras constituted 83% of the total. See id.
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT:
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION ICE-O&S -13
(2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/U.S.%20Immigration%20and% 
20Customs%20Enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FZG-MQG7]. In fiscal year 2019, ICE 
requested funding for 47,000 immigrant detention beds, including 44,500 adult beds and 2,500 
family beds. Id. The prior year it had requested funding for over 51,000 beds. Id.
 7. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, 238 (1896) (invalidating criminal 
punishment for unlawfully present noncitizens without a trial, but noting, “We think it clear that 
detention or temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the 
provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, would be valid”); cf. Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Immigration Detention: No Turning Back?, 113 S. ATLANTIC Q. 621, 623 (2014) (“The glaring 
problem with the legal doctrine that constructs immigration detention as nonpunitive is that it is 
a fiction. Detention is punitive, and it is experienced as such by immigrants.”); César Cuauhtémoc 
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immigrant detention facilities are virtually indistinguishable from jails 
and prisons.8 Many noncitizens are held in facilities operated by 
private-prison corporations and are in remote locations far from 
detainees’ communities.9 There are significant restrictions on access to 
counsel10 and contact with family members.11 Substandard conditions 
in these facilities have been documented extensively.12 The 
government and various media outlets have documented deficiencies 
in access to medical services,13 lack of hygiene in bathrooms, and poor 
food quality,14 as well as the extensive use of solitary confinement.15 
García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349–50 
(2014) (identifying similarities between immigrant detention and criminal incarceration); Anil 
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010) 
(suggesting that immigrant detention has evolved into a “quasi-punitive system of 
immcarceration”). 
8. See SCHRIRO, supra note 4, at 2 (“With only a few exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses 
to detain aliens were built, and operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced 
felons. ICE relies primarily on correctional incarceration standards . . . and on correctional 
principles of care, custody, and control.”). 
9. Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, A National Study of Immigration Detention in the United 
States, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 & tbl.2 (2018). In fiscal year 2015, 10% of detention facilities 
were operated by private, for-profit prison corporations, and 67% of all immigrant detainees were 
held in such facilities. Id.
 10. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in 
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2015) (finding that nondetained respondents in 
removal proceedings are almost five times more likely to secure representation by counsel than 
detained respondents). 
 11. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE 
TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES 11 (2019), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8N72-PSGK]. Unfortunately, in many cases the noncitizen is detained with family members, 
including children. See generally Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer & Jana Whalley, Detaining Families: 
A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 785 (2018) (examining 
asylum adjudication for families in detention).
 12. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, supra note 11 (documenting 
results from unannounced site visits at four detention facilities and reporting unhealthy 
conditions, absence of outside recreation facilities, and unjustified strip searches, among other 
violations); see also generally SCHRIRO, supra note 4 (identifying deficiencies in the management 
of the immigrant detention system).
 13. See, e.g., SCHRIRO, supra note 4, at 25–26; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-16-231, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN 
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF DETAINEE MEDICAL CARE (2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675484.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LKC-Y3DN]. 
 14. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, supra note 11, at 3–4, 8–10 (noting 
the failure of ICE facilities to comply with ICE’s food and hygiene standards).
 15. Urbina, supra note 1; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-38,
IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD STRENGTHEN DHS EFFORTS TO 
ADDRESS SEXUAL ABUSE (2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659145.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5UEX-SARW]. 
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Given the severe backlog in the adjudication of removal proceedings, 
detention in this system may last months or even years.16 
Many of the individuals initially detained by immigration-
enforcement officers17—though not all18—have the right to a bond 
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) to argue for their release.19 
IJs—the same officials who ultimately determine whether the 
noncitizen will be deported—are adjudicatory officials who preside 
over formal, on-the-record hearings.20 They are structurally insulated 
from enforcement or prosecutorial duties and are understood to 
exercise “independent judgment” in their decision-making.21 Yet, 
housed within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), they are explicitly subordinate to the 
Attorney General.22 Further, they do not enjoy the tenure protections 
16. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 9, at 2 (finding that in fiscal year 2015, the average length of 
immigrant detention was thirty-eight days, but “tens of thousands were detained for many months 
or years”). 
17. Immigration-enforcement officials who apprehend a noncitizen suspected to be 
removable make the initial determination as to whether the noncitizen will be detained pending 
the outcome of removal proceedings. For those who are not subject to mandatory detention, see
infra note 18, the official may release the noncitizen on conditional parole—release on 
recognizance—or on bond of at least $1,500. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2018); 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1003.19, 
1236.1(d)(1) (2019).
 18. Congress mandates the detention of certain categories of noncitizens in removal 
proceedings, denying any opportunity for bond altogether. These include noncitizens 
apprehended at the border, as well as those removable on certain criminal and national security 
grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–31 (2003) 
(affirming the constitutionality of mandatory detention under section 1226(c)). In Jennings v. 
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), the Supreme Court interpreted the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., to preclude any bond hearing for these categories of 
detainees even if their detention had been for prolonged periods of over six months. In last term’s 
decision in Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019), the Court again interpreted the INA, this time 
to mandate the detention without bond of noncitizens arrested by immigration officials years after 
being released from criminal incarceration. 
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported that from fiscal year 2011 to 
fiscal year 2013, 77% to 80% of noncitizens in detention facilities were subject to mandatory 
detention. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM 
EFFECTIVENESS 28 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZEW-
EN5V].
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19. 
 20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (describing removal proceedings). 
21. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10. 
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (defining “immigration judge” as “an attorney whom the Attorney 
General appoints” and who “shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as 
the Attorney General shall prescribe”). 
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of Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”),23 much less those of Article 
III federal judges.24 
It is commonly accepted that the decisions of enforcement officials 
may, and perhaps should, comply with the policy preferences of the 
president.25 But whether adjudicatory decisions, even those made by 
 23. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS 
OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 1, 62–68 (2016) (cataloging different types of 
agency adjudications presided over by non-ALJs, including immigration-court hearings); KENT 
BARNETT, MALIA REDDICK, LOGAN CORNETT & RUSSELL WHEELER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE 
OF THE U.S., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION,
OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 60–61 (2018) (comparing tenure protections of ALJs with other 
agency adjudicators, including IJs); Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New 
World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 143–45, 153–57 (2019) (discussing the 
“new world” of agency adjudication occurring before non-ALJs and noting the uniqueness of 
litigation before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) because its adjudications are not 
subject to review by the politically appointed head of the agency).
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that judges “shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour, and shall . . . receive . . . Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office”). Immigration law scholars have long recognized the importance of 
independence among IJs. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on 
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 385–403 (2006) (articulating the necessity of 
independence among the IJ corps); cf.Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative 
Law Context: The Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
475, 481 (2007) (discussing the “tension between the oversight that promotes consistency and 
accuracy and the decisional independence of agency adjudicators”).
25. For an examination of the constitutional, historical, and practical scope of presidential 
authority over immigration law, see Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 461–63 (2009). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, 
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 962–63 (1998) 
(examining the separation-of-powers concerns raised by executive branch detention of 
noncitizens). For discussions of presidential control over administrative agencies more generally, 
see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical 
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 50–52, 65–70 (2006) 
(examining mechanisms for presidential influence over agency decision-making); Rebecca 
Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 143 (2018) 
(discussing the resistance of career agency officials to presidential control and noting practical 
constraints on the bureaucracy’s ability to constrain presidential action); Elizabeth Magill & 
Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036–38 (2011) 
(analyzing the allocation of power between different agency stakeholders, including politically 
appointed agency leadership and civil servants); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, Presidential 
Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 35 
YALE J. ON REG. 549, 610–12 (2018) (identifying concerns associated with presidential control 
over agencies); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 245 (1987) (examining 
how agency structure ensures bureaucratic compliance with the desires of political actors); Gillian 
E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers,
59 EMORY L.J. 423, 423–26 (2009) (examining how internal constraints on agency action work 
with external constraints to check “aggrandized presidential authority”); Gillian E. Metzger & 
Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.REV. 1239, 1246–48 (2017) (examining 
agency structures, civil service, and professionalism as forming a body of law that constrains 
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administrative officials, should be made on the basis of a president’s 
political agenda is far more controversial.26 Our constitutional system 
places a heavy premium on the independence of adjudications, 
reflected in the extraordinary tenure protections afforded to Article III 
judges.27 Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall have characterized 
adjudicatory independence as the “sine qua non of procedural due 
process,” expressing concern that “if the adjudicator is himself an 
integral part of the governmental body on the other side of the case,” 
then the “government would, in effect, be the judge of its own case.”28 
As such, even then-Professor Elena Kagan—who as an academic 
championed presidential control over agency decisions29—conceded 
that in the context of individual adjudications, “presidential 
participation . . . of whatever form, would contravene procedural 
norms and inject an inappropriate influence into the resolution of 
controversies.”30 Adjudicatory independence is particularly important 
executive overreach); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 520 (2015) (examining how the distribution of power between political 
appointees and the independent civil service in the modern administrative state produces checks 
and balances to constrain agency power); and Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and 
the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (1994) (examining the role of the 
presidency in agency action). 
 26. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better 
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1300 (1962) (“Everyone, including the 
presidential activists, seems to agree that ‘the outcome of any particular adjudicatory matter is . . . 
as much beyond . . . [the President’s] concern . . . as the outcome of any cause pending in the 
courts . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY 
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 33 (1960))); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency 
Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1211 (2013) (asserting the existence of a “network of 
tacit unwritten conventions” protecting agency adjudications from political interference); cf. 
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical 
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1480 (2009) (maintaining that a 
major issue regarding ALJs is not whether they are sufficiently independent, but rather whether 
they are sufficiently deliberative); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 
46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (1994) (advocating for increased supervision and monitoring over 
agency adjudicators); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an 
Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. 589, 603–07 (1993) 
(proposing a system to evaluate the performance of ALJs); James E. Moliterno, The 
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1191–92, 1209– 
34 (2006) (arguing that agency adjudicators should be impartial but not independent). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
28. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values 
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 477 (1986); see also Kent H. Barnett, Some Kind of 
Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. 515, 524–37 (2019) (discussing the due process interest in non-
ALJ impartiality).
 29. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251–52 (2001). 
 30. Id. at 2363. 
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in the context of immigrant detention decisions, given the explicit 
deprivation of liberty as well as the length and conditions of 
confinement. At present, however, little is known about whether, as an 
empirical matter, IJs comply with the policy preferences of the 
president and his political appointees or whether they instead preserve 
decision-making independence.31 
In earlier work, we evaluated the extent to which IJs operate 
independently from their political superiors in rendering the final 
decision to remove.32 Using logistic regression and controlling for over 
a dozen variables commonly analyzed in assessing deportation 
outcomes, we found that the identity of the presidential administration 
that appointed the IJ was not a statistically significant factor in 
predicting whether or not that judge ordered a noncitizen deported 
from the country.33 We did find, however, that the identity of the 
presidential administration in control at the time of the removal decision 
was a statistically significant predictor of removal outcomes.34 For 
example, George W. Bush (“Bush II”) appointees were 22% less likely 
to order removal during the Obama Era than during the Trump Era, 
31. Scholars outside of the immigration field have examined the independence of agency 
adjudicators, focusing largely on political supervision over ALJs. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. 
Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J.
ON REG. 1, 3–4 (2017) (examining the decision-making of ALJs within the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”)); Charles D. Delorme, Jr., R. Carter Hill & Norman J. Wood, 
The Determinants of Voting by the National Labor Relations Board on Unfair Labor Practice 
Cases:1955–1975, 37 PUB. CHOICE 207, 216 (1981) (examining the impact of presidential ideology 
on National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) members’ voting patterns); Nicholas R. Seabrook, 
Eric M. Wilk & Charles M. Lamb, Administrative Law Judges in Fair Housing Enforcement: 
Attitudes, Case Facts, and Political Control, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 362, 363, 373 (2013) (conducting an 
empirical assessment of the voting patterns of ALJs assigned to fair-housing cases); Amy Semet, 
Political Decision-Making at the National Labor Relations Board: An Empirical Examination of 
the Board’s Unfair Labor Practice Decisions Through the Clinton and Bush II Years, 37 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 226–28 (2016) (examining the NLRB’s review of ALJ 
decisions); Cole D. Taratoot & Robert M. Howard, The Labor of Judging: Examining 
Administrative Law Judge Decisions, 39 AM. POL. RES. 832, 834 (2011) (finding no relationship 
between case outcomes of ALJs and the ideology of political superiors at the NLRB); Cole D. 
Taratoot, The Politics of Administrative Law Judge Decision Making at the FCC in Comparative 
Licensing Cases, 38 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 37–38 (2017) (finding that ALJs at the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) were not subject to political influence by political 
superiors in the executive branch); Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges 
Biased? An Empirical Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 362 (2017) (finding no evidence that 
ALJs within the SEC were biased in favor of the agency). 
32. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political Control over 
Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 579 (2020). 
 33. Id. at 621. 
 34. Id.
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and 22% less likely during the Bush II Era than the Trump Era.35 These 
results suggest that a sitting president may exert some measure of 
direct or indirect influence over IJs’ decisions to deport. 
This project shifts our attention from the final outcome of removal 
proceedings to the decision to detain pending removal proceedings. 
Several studies have examined immigrant detention decisions. In one 
of the earliest of these, Janet Gilboy analyzed a sample of cases in 
Chicago immigration court in 1983 to examine the rates at which IJs 
released noncitizens from detention or reduced bond amounts set by 
enforcement officials.36 Other studies, notably those conducted by 
Ingrid Eagly and Steven Shafer37 and by Emily Ryo,38 have identified 
various factors that were associated with an IJ’s decision to release a 
noncitizen or reduce bond amounts—including attorney 
representation, whether the noncitizen was part of a family unit 
claiming asylum, criminal history, and national origin, among other 
variables. This Article, however, is the first to focus on the potential 
for political influence over detention decisions. A given presidential 
administration might seek to influence detention decisions through its 
power to appoint like-minded IJs who are likely to render decisions in 
accord with the administration’s policy preferences or through its 
 35. Id. 
36. Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of Immigration Judges,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 369–70 (1987) (finding that among a sample of 126 detainees, 95%
obtained a reduction in bond amount—including 16% who were released altogether—and that 
bonds were reduced by an average of 68%); see also Robert M. Sanders, Immigration Bond: An 
Analysis of the Determinants of Official Decisions, 20 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 156–59 
(1993) (examining detention decisions of enforcement officials—rather than IJs—in the Miami 
region in the late 1980s to identify factors impacting detention decisions, including criminal 
background, financial assets, country of origin, sex, and family status). 
37. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70 (evaluating the impact of attorney representation 
on detention decisions and finding that represented noncitizens were almost seven times more 
likely to be released from detention than pro se litigants); see also Eagly et al., supra note 11, at 
837–38 (examining the adjudication of claims brought by detained families seeking asylum and 
finding that 19% of such families were released from custody, as compared to only 1% of 
individuals who were not part of family units).
 38. Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
117, 118–19, 146–47 (2016) [hereinafter Ryo, A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings] (examining 
a sample of long-term detainees in the Central District of California to find that one of the most 
important factors impacting IJs’ custody decisions was the noncitizen’s criminal history, and that 
factors relating to flight risk such as family ties or employment were not statistically significant 
predictors in immigrant detention decisions); Emily Ryo, Predicting Danger in Immigration 
Courts, 44 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 227, 245–48 (2019) [hereinafter Ryo, Predicting Danger] 
(analyzing a subset of the earlier sample to find that a noncitizen was more likely to be detained 
on the ground of dangerousness if he or she was Central American, proceeded pro se, or had a 
history of felony and violent convictions). 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 1864 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1855?
power to supervise IJs—for example, through implicit threats to 
employment for decisions that depart from the administration’s 
agenda. 
Presidential administrations have been explicit in their varied 
policy preferences with respect to immigrant detention. For example, 
the Barack Obama administration expressed a clear preference for 
detaining noncitizens with criminal convictions as well as recent 
arrivals.39 The Donald Trump administration, for its part, has 
broadened its priorities to maximize the number of noncitizens 
detained regardless of whether they have criminal backgrounds.40 
Anecdotal reports suggest that IJs have been responsive to those 
preferences. One media report describes the policy changes between 
the Obama and Trump administrations: 
The Obama administration directed immigration judges to use their 
discretion to release eligible immigrants on low-cost bonds or without 
any bond at all . . . . That is no longer the case under President Donald 
Trump . . . . Instead, immigration court judges . . . are increasingly 
denying bond requests altogether, or setting them at amounts in 
excess of $10,000 . . . .41
39. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al., Policies for the Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3–5 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter 
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYV7-WBTC]. 
40. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) (announcing the policy of 
detaining all individuals suspected of violating immigration laws). President Trump and his 
former Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced the end of a policy they termed “catch and 
release,” whereby noncitizens were apprehended and then released while their removal 
proceedings were pending. See, e.g., Memorandum from the President to Sec’y of State et al.,
Ending “Catch and Release” at the Border of the United States and Directing Other 
Enhancements to Immigration Enforcement, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,179 (Apr. 13, 2018); Jeff Sessions, 
Att’y Gen., Remarks on Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-immigration-
enforcement [https://perma.cc/7AMM-BFUF]; Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Remarks to the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training Program (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-
immigration-review-legal [https://perma.cc/C28G-BB9H]; Fact Sheets: Trump Administration 
Immigration Policy Priorities, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/trump-administration-immigration-policy-priorities [https://perma.cc/ 
Z4GR-5ZQQ].
 41. Daniel Bush, Under Trump, Higher Immigration Bonds Mean Longer Family 
Separations, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 28, 2018, 2:38 PM), https://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/politics/under-trump-higher-immigration-bonds-mean-longer-family-separations
[https://perma.cc/YU4B-WWAM]. 
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This Article examines IJs’ responsiveness to the policy 
preferences of their political superiors within the executive branch. We 
analyze government data from approximately 780,000 bond 
proceedings held in immigration courts from January 2001 through 
September 2019.42 Our study thus covers custody decisions rendered 
during the Bush II Era (January 20, 2001 through January 19, 2009), 
the Obama Era (January 20, 2009 through January 19, 2017), and the 
Trump Era (January 20, 2017 through September 30, 2019). We refer 
to each of these periods as presidential “eras.” The data on bond 
hearings generally provide detailed information on case outcomes, 
including data on whether the individual was released on recognizance, 
granted bond, denied bond, or some other decision; the identity of the 
IJ who made the decision; and, where bond was granted, the amount 
of bond set. We analyze these data to identify descriptive political 
trends in bond decisions across different presidential eras. For 
example, are noncitizens less likely to be released on recognizance 
during the Trump Era as compared to preceding administrations? Are 
they more likely to be denied bond altogether? Where bond is granted, 
are bond rates higher today than they were during the Obama or Bush 
II Eras? We further analyze how different appointee cohorts behave 
during each era. For example, do IJs appointed by Clinton differ in 
their behavior across different presidential eras? 
We find that on every metric of bond hearings, noncitizens fared 
worse during the Trump Era than they did during either the Bush II or 
Obama Eras. Although rates of release on recognizance were 
extremely low throughout the period of study, they started at 2% of all 
 42. See Frequently Requested Agency Records, U.S. DEP’T JUST., EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR 
IMMIGR. REV. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/frequently-requested-agency-records 
[https://perma.cc/XB3V-4K59]. In 2008, TRAC researchers at Syracuse University successfully 
filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) to force EOIR to release the 
data, and EOIR published these data on its website pursuant to reporting standards under the 
FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2018)). We limited the analysis to cases involving removal, detention, or exclusion proceedings. 
Overall, our analysis of the data indicated that over 99% of the bond proceedings fell within one 
of these categories. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 109–23 (2016) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1205666/download [https://perma.cc/?
GY7U-CDAH]. We eliminated the bond proceedings for the following case types: (1) “credible 
fear” cases, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42 (2019); (2) “withholding-only” cases, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2018); 
(3) “reasonable fear” cases involving noncitizens with a reinstated order of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 
208.31; (4) “asylum only” cases, 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(f); (5) “claimed status review,” 8 C.F.R. § 
1235.3(b)(5); and (6) claims under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-100, § 203, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193–2200 (1997). Id.; see also IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra, at 118–33. Rescission cases were also excluded. 
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cases decided during the Bush II Era, dropping to 0.23% during the 
Obama Era and then to 0.17% during the Trump Era. Similarly, while 
only 7% of custody hearings during the Bush II Era resulted in an 
outright denial of bond, that figure rose to 14% during the Obama Era 
and 18% during the Trump Era. Perhaps more telling, overall 
noncitizen win rates—release on, granting of bond when ICE denies 
bond, or lower bond amounts—indicate that all appointee cohorts 
were less likely to award relief to noncitizens during the Trump Era 
than during the Obama Era. For example, while IJs appointed during 
the George H.W. Bush (“Bush I”) Era granted a favorable outcome to 
the noncitizen in 38% of all cases between 2001 and 2019, they awarded 
such relief in only 12% of cases during the Trump Era. Although this 
analysis does not control for other factors, these preliminary, bivariate 
results suggest that presidents may influence bond decisions not only 
through their power to appoint more like-minded IJs, but also through 
their power to supervise earlier appointees. 
An examination of bond amounts set by IJs reveals a similar 
picture. Bond medians grew from $5,000 during the Bush II Era to 
$6,500 during the Obama Era, and then jumped to $8,000 during the 
Trump Era. Indeed, 43% of the bonds set by IJs during the Trump Era 
were $10,000 or higher, as compared to only 24% and 25% for the 
Obama and Bush II Eras, respectively. Again, breaking down these 
results by appointee cohort indicates that earlier-appointed IJs mostly 
issued higher bond amounts during the Trump Era than during 
preceding administrations. 
Our bivariate analyses do not control for other factors that might 
independently influence bond decisions. We do not control for the 
multitude of potential independent variables such as the individual 
circumstances of the noncitizen (including whether he or she is part of 
a family unit or was represented by counsel), the demographic 
characteristics of the IJs, changes in migration patterns, the 
sociopolitical or socioeconomic contexts in which bond decisions are 
made, geographic factors related to the court location, or the 
institutional behavior of other political actors like Congress, the circuit 
courts, or the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).43 As such, our 
conclusions are purely descriptive and do not seek to make causal 
inferences. They do, however, show trends that indicate statistically 
significant differences and raise the question of whether IJs are 
43. Unlike the current analysis, in our analysis of removal decisions, we controlled for these 
variables. Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 607–18. 
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politically independent. We hope that these findings will encourage 
further research into the factors that shape, and those that should 
shape, immigrant detention decisions. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the legal and 
policy context in which immigrant custody decisions are rendered in 
immigration courts. Part II sets forth our analyses. Part III considers 
avenues for further research. We conclude with some thoughts on the 
appropriate role of political actors in immigrant detention decisions. 
I. THE LEGAL AND POLICY CONTEXT FOR IMMIGRANT DETENTION
This Part sets forth the legal and policy context for immigrant 
detention decisions. Section A summarizes the legal framework in 
which immigrant detention decisions are made. Section B describes 
how political preferences for immigrant detention have shifted through 
the Bush II, Obama, and Trump administrations. 
A. The Legal Framework 
Immigrant detention occurs in the context of removal proceedings 
that determine whether a noncitizen can be removed from the country 
and, if so, whether his or her case warrants a discretionary grant of 
relief from removal. Noncitizens within the United States are 
removable where, for example, their presence is unauthorized— 
perhaps because they entered without inspection or overstayed a 
visa44—or where they are lawfully present but engaged in conduct that 
renders them deportable, such as criminal activity.45 These individuals 
generally are entitled to a relatively formal hearing to determine 
whether they will in fact be removed.46 At these hearings, the 
noncitizen is entitled to be represented by private counsel, to present 
44. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(7), 1227(a)(1). Visa overstays account for approximately 40% of the 
undocumented population. Fact Sheets: Enforce Immigration Laws Across the United States,
WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/enforce-
immigration-laws-across-united-states [https://perma.cc/X42J-85YV]. In fiscal year 2016, 628,000 
noncitizens overstayed their visas. Id.
 45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
 46. See id. § 1229a (describing removal proceedings). Some noncitizens are not entitled to 
formal removal proceedings and are instead subject to “expedited removal.” See id. § 1225(b)(1) 
(applying expedited removal to certain categories of noncitizens lacking proper documentation 
or engaged in fraud); id. § 1225(c) (extending expedited removal to individuals posing a threat to 
national security).
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evidence and witnesses, to cross-examine evidence and witnesses, and 
to a formal record of the proceedings.47 
Noncitizens often do not contest the grounds for removal, and 
their individual merits hearings typically focus on whether the 
immigration court will grant relief from removal.48 Congress has 
legislated various forms of discretionary relief, including “asylum” 
where the individual establishes a “well-founded fear of persecution” 
on one of five protected grounds;49 “waivers” of various grounds for 
removability;50 and “cancellation of removal” where the noncitizen 
satisfies a list of statutory eligibility factors.51 For decades, noncitizens 
could also seek a form of relief called “administrative closure,” which 
removed a case from the immigration court’s active docket where, for 
example, the noncitizen would soon qualify for legal residence through 
a family member or was in the process of litigating a direct challenge 
to a criminal conviction that formed the basis for removal.52 Given the 
significant evidentiary burdens on noncitizens in seeking these forms 
of relief53 and the staggering backlog of pending cases,54 these removal 
 47. See id. § 1229a(b)(4). 
 48. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 723 
(8th ed. 2016). 
 49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining the term “refugee”); id. § 1158 (setting forth 
procedures for granting asylum to individuals within the United States or at the U.S. border who 
meet the statutory definition of “refugee”). Individuals may file for asylum affirmatively, before 
removal proceedings have been initiated, or defensively, after removal proceedings have been 
initiated. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-72, ASYLUM: VARIATION EXISTS IN 
OUTCOMES OF APPLICANTS ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 1–2 (2016), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680976.pdf [https://perma.cc/24B4-TY2S] . 
 50. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii), (a)(1)(H), (a)(7) (setting forth waiver 
categories). 
 51. Id. § 1229b. 
52. The Trump administration curtailed the use of administrative closure as an option for 
IJs. In In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018), the Attorney General exercised 
his refer-and-review authority to overturn BIA precedent acknowledging the propriety of 
administrative closure. The Fourth Circuit overturned In re Castro-Tum in Romero v. Barr, 937 
F.3d 282, 297 (4th Cir. 2019), preserving the availability of this form of discretionary relief in that 
circuit. 
 53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (imposing burden on noncitizen to show that relief from 
removal is warranted). 
 54. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING 
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES 22, 25–26 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/690/685022.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC3T-VKQY] (describing increases in initial case-
completion times and the resulting case backlog). 
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proceedings often take years to resolve.55 A crucial question for 
noncitizens, then, is whether they will be detained pending the 
completion of those proceedings.56 
When an individual is initially apprehended on suspicion of 
removability,57 enforcement officials within the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) agency make the initial determination as to 
whether the individual will be detained.58 Congress has imposed 
mandatory detention for certain categories of noncitizens, including 
those apprehended at the border59 and those who are removable on 
certain criminal and national security grounds.60 For those who are not 
subject to mandatory detention, ICE exercises discretion to release the 
noncitizen on conditional parole (also known as release on 
recognizance), set a bond of at least $1,500, or deny bond altogether.61 
 55. See id. 
56. For an overview of the statutory framework for immigrant detention, see generally
HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45915, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A LEGAL 
OVERVIEW (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45915.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF34-LHDK].
57. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2019). ICE officials are also responsible for representing the 
government in prosecuting the noncitizen during removal proceedings. IMMIGRATION COURT 
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 42, at 2.
 58. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (setting forth regulations for detention of noncitizens prior to order 
of removal). 
 59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). DHS enforcement officials retain authority to release these 
noncitizens through a grant of humanitarian parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or 
significant public benefit” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). For many years, the BIA concluded 
that arriving noncitizens who lack proper documentation—and are thus “subject to expedited 
removal”—and who can establish a credible fear of persecution to form an asylum claim were not 
subject to mandatory detention and remained eligible for release on bond if they were 
apprehended at a port of entry, but not if they were apprehended between ports of entry. In re
X-K-, 23 I.&N.Dec. 731, 732 (BIA 2005). Attorney General William Barr overruled that decision 
in In re M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019). The Western District of Washington, 
however, has concluded that individuals apprehended in the nation’s interior and subject to 
expedited removal are constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ if they establish a 
credible fear of persecution. Padilla v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 
1223, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2019), aff’d in part, 2020 WL 1482393 (9th Cir. 2020).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). These individuals may be released only for witness-protection 
purposes. Id. § 1226(c)(2).
 61. Id. § 1226(a); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1 (setting forth regulations for detention of 
noncitizens prior to ordering removal). Conditional parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B) 
differs from humanitarian parole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5). Conditional parole allows the release 
of a noncitizen who is subject to discretionary detention provisions and may impose conditions 
on release. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B). Humanitarian parole allows the release of any arriving 
noncitizen, including those subject to mandatory detention, but only where such release is for an 
“urgent humanitarian reason or significant benefit.” Id. § 1182(d)(5). Conditional parole may be 
granted by either DHS officials or an IJ; humanitarian parole can only be granted by DHS 
officials. See In re Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. 257, 260–61 (BIA 2010). 
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An individual who has been detained by enforcement officers, 
however, has a right to appeal that initial custody determination by 
seeking a bond hearing before an IJ.62 Like the ICE officials before 
them, IJs have authority to release the noncitizen on conditional 
parole, set a bond amount, deny bond altogether, or issue another 
decision.63 Children are subject to different detention rules.64 
Although IJs are also responsible for adjudicating the question of 
whether the noncitizen ultimately will be removed,65 regulations 
provide that bond proceedings must be “separate and apart from, and 
shall form no part of” the removal proceeding.66 The IJ may consider 
any information available to him or her in rendering the custody 
decision.67 A noncitizen may subsequently request an additional bond 
hearing after the first, but only upon showing that circumstances have 
materially changed.68 
At the start of October 2019, there were 442 IJs serving across the 
United States—the most in U.S. history.69  IJs possess many of the 
powers associated with ordinary judges; for example, they are 
authorized to administer oaths, receive evidence, examine and cross-
62. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19; see also id. § 1236.1(d) (allowing noncitizens to request amelioration 
of release conditions). Such hearings are sometimes referred to as “bond redetermination 
hearings” or “custody redetermination hearings.” Noncitizens subject to mandatory detention 
generally are not entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. See id. § 1003.19(h)(1)(i). A noncitizen 
may seek a Joseph hearing for the IJ to determine whether he or she falls within one of the 
categories for mandatory detention. See In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (BIA 1999).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d) (providing that requests for amelioration 
of custody conditions are made to IJs); id. § 1003.19(a) (providing that custody and bond 
determinations are reviewable by IJs). 
64. In a class action lawsuit over juvenile detention, the government entered into a 
settlement agreement in 1997 known as the Flores Settlement imposing time limits on the 
detention of juveniles. See Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the 
Flores litigation and settlement). The Trump administration has taken the position that those 
limits apply only to unaccompanied juveniles, not to children traveling with parents. 84 Fed. Reg. 
44,392 (Aug. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 212, 236). See generally Peter Margulies, 
What Ending the Flores Agreement on Detention of Immigrant Children Really Means, LAWFARE 
(Aug. 29, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ending-flores-agreement-detention-
immigrant-children-really-means [https://perma.cc/LG6H-YF3D] (describing shifting policies on 
the detention of immigrant children). 
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1). 
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. § 1003.19(e). 
69. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for 
Immigration Review Announces Case Completion Numbers for Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/executive-office-immigration-review-announces-case-completion-
numbers-fiscal-year-2019 [https://perma.cc/PH7C-YHJR]. 
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examine witnesses, issue subpoenas, and hold individuals in 
contempt.70 IJs do not possess enforcement or prosecutorial 
responsibilities. Rather, they are designed to be independent and 
apolitical. Indeed, regulations provide: “In deciding the individual 
cases before them, and subject to the applicable governing standards, 
immigration judges shall exercise their independent judgment and 
discretion . . . .”71 Due process may well mandate such independence 
given the liberty interests at stake in detention decisions. 
Despite these norms of adjudicatory independence, IJs are 
executive branch officials subordinate to the Attorney General. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) explicitly provides they 
shall be appointed by the Attorney General and “subject to such 
supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General 
shall prescribe.”72 IJs do not enjoy the tenure protections of ALJs 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).73 Instead, their 
independence is protected only to the extent of ordinary civil service 
laws.74 
Outside of the mandatory-detention context, the Supreme Court 
has authorized the detention of a noncitizen pending removal 
proceedings on two grounds only: (1) to ensure the noncitizen appears 
for removal proceedings75 or (2) for public-safety reasons.76 Circuit 
courts frequently affirm that immigrant detention is warranted only 
where the noncitizen poses a flight risk or danger to the community.77 
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2018). 
71. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10. 
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4). 
 73. See supra note 23. 
 74. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY &OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135, 137 (2008), 
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L44T-C599] (detailing an 
investigation into the hiring of IJs, “which are career positions protected by the civil services 
laws”); see also Legomsky, supra note 24, at 372–79 (describing civil service protections of IJs and 
the BIA). 
 75. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003) (noting that detention “necessarily 
serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their 
removal proceedings”). 
 76. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541, 544 (1952) (sustaining the detention of 
Communist noncitizens in removal proceedings for public-safety reasons). 
 77. See, e.g., Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 224 & n.12, 226 
n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that detention is permitted only if a noncitizen “poses a risk of 
flight or a danger to the community” or if an “alien’s release or removal is imminent” (first 
quoting Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated by Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. 
Ct. 1260 (2018) (mem.); then quoting Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 
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IJs may consider a wide range of factors in determining flight risk or 
public-safety risk, including whether the noncitizen has a fixed address 
in the United States, length of U.S. residence, family ties, employment 
history, record of court appearances, criminal record, history of 
immigration violations, prior attempts to flee, and manner of entry into 
the United States.78 IJs enjoy a great deal of discretion in determining 
which factors to consider.79 The IJ’s discretion is further enhanced by 
the lack of federal court review over detention decisions. The IJ’s 
decision is subject to review by the BIA,80 but the INA provides that 
decisions “regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, 
revocation, or denial of bond or parole” shall not be subject to judicial 
review.81 
B. Policy Preferences of Political Superiors Within the Executive 
Branch 
IJs are understood to exercise “independent judgment” based on 
the record of the proceedings, but they may, nonetheless, be 
susceptible to deciding cases in accordance with the policy preferences 
of their political superiors in the executive branch. The Bush II, 
Obama, and Trump administrations each took public positions with 
respect to immigrant detention, which might have influenced IJs in 
deciding individual cases. 
2011))); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that detention depends 
on whether a noncitizen “present[s] a danger to persons or property, is not a threat to the national 
security, and does not pose a risk of flight” (quoting In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 
2006), abrogated on other grounds by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. 
Mass. 2018))); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding that 
Congress intended for immigrant detention to “prevent[] flight and recidivism”); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 236.1(c)(8) (2019) (noting that an arresting officer may release certain noncitizens provided that 
such release would not pose a danger and that the noncitizen is likely to appear for future 
proceedings); id. § 1236.1(c)(8) (applying the same standard of release to noncitizens not covered 
under § 236.1(c)(8)); In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1111–13 (BIA 1999) (applying ?
§ 236.1(c)(8)), abrogated by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. Mass. 2018) 
(holding that the burden of proving flight risk or dangerousness lies with the government, not the 
noncitizen).
 78. In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40.
 79. Id. at 37; see also Carlson, 342 U.S. at 543 (noting that the Attorney General is vested 
with wide discretion as to bail in cases involving noncitizens). 
80. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(a). 
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2018). The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that noncitizens retain 
the right to habeas review to challenge their detention as a violation of the U.S. Constitution or 
federal statute. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (holding that § 1226(e) does not bar 
habeas review). 
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In 2006, President George W. Bush announced his 
administration’s policy preference for detaining noncitizens entering 
the United States without documentation, ending the “catch-and-
release” policies of the past, and increasing detention capacity.82 At the 
same time, however, he urged Congress to enact comprehensive 
immigration reform to grant a path to lawful status for longtime 
undocumented residents, implicitly suggesting that these individuals 
should not be deported, much less detained.83 
The Obama administration expressed policy preferences that 
were somewhat more complex, ultimately broadening the categories of 
noncitizens who would be prioritized for detention. Like his 
predecessor, President Obama urged Congress to enact comprehensive 
immigration reform;84 indeed, he went further to announce a policy of 
granting deferred action, a form of relief from removal, for individuals 
brought to the United States as children85—and then for parents of U.S. 
citizens and legal residents86—as long as they passed certain 
requirements, including criminal background checks.87 Under these 
new policies, millions of noncitizens were shielded from removal and, 
as a corollary, detention. At the same time, however, the Obama 
administration prioritized the detention not only of recent arrivals as 
the Bush II administration had, but also noncitizens with criminal 
backgrounds.88 The administration also piloted a risk-assessment tool 
in 2013 to systematize which noncitizens would be detained as a danger 
82. President George W. Bush, Speech on Immigration (May 15, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/washington/15text-bush.html [https://perma.cc/7TRA-MCKZ].
 83. See id.
84. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, News Conference (Nov. 14, 2012), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1156 
[https://perma.cc/U2MP-ZLFW]. 
85. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-
immigration [https://perma.cc/CR6K-TMFQ] (announcing the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program). 
86. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/ 
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/5PX2-PPGS] (announcing the 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program). 
87. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Comm., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 2 (June 15, 
2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-
who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G59-FV7F]; Memorandum from Jeh Charles 
Johnson, supra note 39, at 3–5. 
 88. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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or a flight risk.89 Then, in 2014, the administration adopted a policy of 
detaining, without the possibility for release, the growing numbers of 
unaccompanied minors and families who crossed the Southern Border 
seeking asylum from Mexico or Central America.90 
The Trump administration adopted an even broader approach to 
immigrant detention, announcing a policy of detaining all noncitizens 
charged with removal. Within one week of his inauguration, President 
Trump issued an executive order explicitly stating his administration’s 
policy of detaining all noncitizens suspected of violating immigration 
laws.91 In February of that year, the administration issued a directive to 
all ICE employees—but not IJs—to detain all noncitizens pending 
removal proceedings except in narrow circumstances.92 It continued, 
“There is no presumption that an individual alien’s release would not 
pose a danger or risk of flight.”93 
In April of 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions addressed a 
group of DHS’s Customs and Border Protection officers and stated, 
“Pursuant to the President’s executive order, we will now be detaining 
all adults who are apprehended at the border.”94 Then, on October 12, 
 89. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
ENFORCEMENT INTEGRATED DATABASE (EID) RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT (RCA
1.0), ENFORCE ALIEN REMOVAL MODULE (EARM5.0), AND CRIME ENTRY SCREEN (CES 2.0), 
at 3–4 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_piaupdate_EID_april2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XTT3-FBAB] (describing the new, automated Risk Classification Assessment 
tool). For a detailed description and criticism of the Risk Classification Assessment tool, see 
generally Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014). 
 90. See Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive Promise of Freedom from 
Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 185 (2016) (“[I]n the summer of 2014, DHS 
adopted a policy of detention without the possibility for release on bond for mothers and children 
arriving from Central America to seek asylum in the United States.”); see also id. at 212 (“After 
an initial period when the DHS insisted on continued detention [of Central American mothers 
and children] without potential for release on bond, DHS began setting across-the-board bond 
amounts as a condition of release.” (footnote omitted)). These individuals were subject to 
mandatory detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2018), but DHS officials—though not 
IJs—retained authority to release them on humanitarian parole, see supra note 61.
91. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
92. Memorandum from Matthew T. Albence, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t, to All Enf’t & Removal Operations Emps., Implementing the President’s Border 
Security and Interior Immigration Enforcement Policies 1–3 (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-memo-on-implementing-the-presidents-border [https://perma.cc/
9Z46-62NQ].
 93. Id. at 3. 
 94. Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Remarks Announcing the Department of Justice’s Renewed 
Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017), 
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2017, then-Attorney General Sessions addressed IJs directly, 
complaining about the Obama administration’s policy of releasing 
noncitizens who demonstrated a fear of persecution.95 He asserted, 
“Not surprisingly, many of those who are released into the United 
States . . . simply disappear and never show up at their immigration 
hearings.”96 More recently, the Trump administration has 
demonstrated a policy preference for simply turning away asylum 
claimants seeking entry at the Southern Border, rather than detaining 
them within the United States.97 
The extent to which IJs, as opposed to enforcement officers, are 
responsive to the policy preferences of political appointees in the 
executive branch remains to be seen. Media reports based on anecdotal 
evidence suggest that they are.98 This study seeks to examine whether 
bivariate analyses, without additional controls, show statistically 
significant differences in IJs’ bond decision-making based on either (1) 
the president whose Attorney General appointed the IJ; or (2) the 
sitting presidential administration.99 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-
department-justice-s-renewed [https://perma.cc/7S8R-N3RP]. 
 95. Jeff Sessions,Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (Oct. 
12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-
executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/4XBV-J2EP].
 96. Id.
97. Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to L. Francis 
Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al., Policy Guidance for Implementation 
of the Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
T855-8JN7] (describing the announcement of “Migrant Protection Protocols” to require asylum 
claimants to remain in Mexico pending adjudication of their claims in immigration court). 
 98. See Bush, supra note 41 (noting that the practice of setting large bonds for detained 
immigrants appears to have grown under the Trump administration); Mica Rosenberg & Reade 
Levinson, Trump’s Catch-and-Detain Policy Snares Many Who Have Long Called U.S. Home, 
REUTERS (June 20, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
immigration-court [https://perma.cc/DQ5R-KESX] (concluding that immigration officials are 
increasingly denying bond under the Trump administration); see also Alejandro Fernández 
Sanabria, Inti Pacheco & Antonio Cucho, Costly Bonds: For Undocumented Immigrants, Bail 
Depends on a Judge’s Subjectivity, UNIVISION NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:41 PM), 
https://www.univision.com/univision-news/immigration/costly-bonds-for-undocumented-immigrants 
-freedom-depends-on-a-judges-subjectivity [https://perma.cc/VF2U-DQZN] (offering 
descriptive information that bond amounts differ by the ideological leanings of IJs). 
99. Specifically, the analysis is done using a chi-square test to analyze whether two variables 
are independent. If differences were random, we would expect 95% of the resulting p-values to 
be greater than 0.05. Here, many of the results have a p-value below 0.05, indicating statistical 
significance. 
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II. ANALYSIS
We reviewed EOIR records to examine political trends in IJs’ 
bond decisions. This Part begins with an overview of how we 
constructed our dataset. It then sets forth our findings from two 
analyses: changes in “win rates” for noncitizens and changes in the 
bond amounts set by IJs. This analysis is done in a bivariate manner 
without additional controls to see if the measures differ significantly by 
(1) the president whose Attorney General appointed the IJ; and (2) the 
president in control at the time the decision was rendered, across the 
three most recent presidential administrations. 
A. Construction of the Dataset 
We obtained from the EOIR’s website records of every bond 
hearing in immigration courts from January 20, 2001, through 
September 30, 2019.100  These records identify the IJ before whom the 
request was made, the date of the IJ’s decision, the decision itself, and 
if bond was granted, the bond amount. Where the bond amount was 
missing in the EOIR data, we imputed the amount. 101 
We used two approaches to code for the IJ’s bond decision. First, 
we determined whether the decision was favorable to the noncitizen. 
In this specification, which we call “Custody Hearing Outcomes,” we 
coded the decision as a “win” if the IJ released the noncitizen on 
recognizance, granted bond if ICE denied bond, or set a bond amount 
that was lower than the amount previously set by ICE to the best we 
were able to discern that information. In the second specification, 
which we call “Bond Amounts Set by IJ,” we examine the specific bond 
amounts set by IJs to the extent they could be gleaned from the data, 
categorizing them as “low” if they were $2,500 or lower and “high” if 
they were $10,000 or higher. 
For each specification, we examine changes through time— 
specifically, during different presidential eras. Custody decisions 
 100. See infra Appendix for further discussion of how the EOIR records were obtained and 
how the analysis was conducted. 
101. We found many internal inconsistencies in EOIR’s coding on the old and new bond 
amounts. For example, some cases coded as a “no bond” decision actually had a dollar amount 
listed in the “new bond” column. We treated such decisions as no bond cases and excluded the 
dollar amount from further analysis when calculating the IJ’s bond. There was also much missing 
data, particularly for initial ICE bond amounts. Missingness in the data cannot be ignored because 
there could be a correlation between the missing data and a given decision, IJ, court location, or 
some other factor. Some IJs, for example, may always record the data, while others do not. We 
explain in the Appendix how we imputed data for missing data. 
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rendered from January 20, 2001, through January 19, 2009, were coded 
as “Bush II Era.” Custody proceedings decided from January 20, 2009, 
through January 19, 2017, were coded as “Obama Era.” Cases decided 
from January 20, 2017, through September 30, 2019, were coded as 
“Trump Era.” This analysis shows differences across eras in rates at 
which IJs as a whole granted a favorable custody decision to 
noncitizens as well as how the bond amounts set by IJs differ across 
eras. 
For each era, we further analyze the behavior of different cohorts 
of appointees. For example, during the Trump Era, we compared the 
bond decisions of Trump appointees, Obama appointees, Bush II 
appointees, Clinton appointees, Bush I appointees, and Reagan 
appointees. This exercise allows us to show descriptively whether there 
are statistically significant differences in the way cohorts of judge 
appointees made decisions on bond redeterminations during different 
eras, though without controlling for other variables. 
Importantly, our study is limited to using cross-tabulations to 
conduct bivariate analyses. Unlike our prior analysis on politicization 
in the removal process,102 we do not conduct a multivariate regression 
analysis, nor do we control for other variables that might impact an IJ’s 
custody decision.103 As such, this study does not attempt to identify 
predictive values or causal relationships. Rather, our much more 
modest goal is to provide a descriptive picture of IJs’ custody decisions, 
examining potential differences in the decision-making of IJs during 
different presidential eras as well as between different appointment 
cohorts. 
B. Custody Hearing Outcomes
We first measure “Custody Hearing Outcomes,” meaning the 
rates at which the noncitizen was released on recognizance, obtained 
bond for the first time if ICE granted no bond, received a lower or 
higher bond amount, was denied bond altogether, or achieved another 
outcome. Table 1 shows changes in these rates across appointee 
cohorts for the full period of study. 
Overall, the rates at which IJs granted release on recognizance 
were notably low; only 0.62% of custody decisions between January 
102. Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 621. 
 103. See infra Part IV(A) (describing other variables that might influence IJs’ custody 
decisions).
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2001 and September 2019 fell into this category.104 IJs were more likely 
(41%) to issue a favorable ruling for the noncitizen by granting bond 
for the first time or by lowering the initial bond amount.105 On the loss 
side, IJs denied bond altogether in 13% of the cases, appeared to 
increase bond in 2% of cases, took no action in 31% of the cases, and 
indicated no change in bond amount in 11% of the cases.106 
1. Differences Between Appointee Cohorts—All Eras. We first 
examine differences between groups of appointees across all eras from 
January 20, 2001, through September 30, 2019, reflected in the top 
section of Table 1. For example, did IJs appointed by Trump behave 
differently than those appointed by Obama or Bush II? This analysis 
examines trends in the relationship between the appointing president 
and bond outcomes, providing percentages of the given outcomes 
broken down by appointee cohort.107 
104. Scholars have reported that some IJs conclude they lack authority to grant release on 
recognizance. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 90, at 189–90. 
105. More often, the initial bond amount was missing, so when the bond decision was coded 
“new amount,” it was impossible to tell whether the IJ set a higher or lower bond amount. It was 
also impossible to determine whether ICE denied bond altogether. If the decision code indicated 
that the noncitizen was released and the bond amounts were missing in cases where the IJ set a 
new bond amount, we assumed that the IJ issued a favorable decision for the noncitizen by 
granting bond for the first time or by lowering the initial bond amount. If the amount remained 
missing, we imputed the median bond based on the presidential era and either bond base city or 
IJ. See infra Appendix. In alternative specifications, we did an imputation analysis for all the 
missing data and did not assume that the IJ bond amount was lower than the ICE amount if the 
noncitizen was released and the data missing. In those specifications, approximately 10% of 
relevant IJ decisions had a higher bond amount than the amount set by ICE. We saw the same 
general trends in the data using this and other alternative imputed measures. 
106. EOIR’s coding does not explain the distinctions between the “no action” and “no 
change” categories. 
107. These figures are across the entire range of the study. For example, the figures for Obama 
appointees are from 2009–2019, while the figures for Trump appointees are only from 2017–2019. 
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TABLE 1: CUSTODY HEARING OUTCOMES AND WIN RATES,
BY APPOINTEE COHORT
All Trump Obama Bush II Clinton Bush I Reagan 
App. App. App. App. App. App. App.
Release 0.62 0.12 0.13 0.22 1.18 0.93 0.93
Lower $ 41.17 37.62 44.56 41.70 41.71 36.88 31.22
Win Rate 41.80 37.74 44.69 41.92 42.89 37.82 32.15
Higher $ 2.31 0.98 1.91 2.46 2.55 2.55 2.88
No Action 31.34 39.16 30.46 29.65 30.75 34.49 34.70
No Change 11.32 7.10 6.37 13.06 11.72 14.54 21.76
No Bond 13.22 15.03 16.57 12.91 12.09 10.61 8.51
Loss Rate 58.20 62.26 55.31 58.08 57.11 62.18 67.85
IJs appointed by earlier administrations in our study were more 
likely to grant release on recognizance than more recently appointed 
IJs. It has been reported that some EOIR documents tell IJs that they 
may lack the power under INA § 236 to grant conditional parole; such 
beliefs may be depressing the percentages for own recognizance 
rulings.108 Throughout the time period of study, Clinton, Bush I, and 
Reagan appointees granted release on recognizance in about 1% of the 
cases, while IJs appointed by Trump, Obama, or Bush II granted 
release in 0.2% of cases or less, perhaps reflecting disparities over time 
in the use of own recognizance rulings. Surprisingly, Obama appointees 
were no more likely to grant release on recognizance than their Trump-
appointed counterparts. Throughout the years of study, Trump and 
Obama appointees granted release in 0.12% and 0.13% of cases, 
respectively. 
But an examination of overall win rates yields a slightly different 
picture, as shown in Figure 1.109 Obama and Clinton appointees had the 
 108. See Andrea Saenz, Not Dangerous, but Too Poor To Get Out of Detention, 
CRIMMIGRATION.COM (Sept. 8, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/09/08/not-
dangerous-but-too-poor-to-get-out-of-detention [https://perma.cc/T2PU-DVTR] (noting a DOJ 
online resource for IJs); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EOIR - IJ BENCHBOOK - TOOLS -
GUIDES - BOND GUIDE 3 (2013), https://federaldefendersny.org/IJ%20Benchbook%20-
%20Tools%20-%20Guides%20-%20Bond%20Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV6C-56C9]
(“Section 236(a) of the Act does not provide for the release of an alien on the alien’s own 
recognizance.”). We have no reason to believe that such beliefs are correlated with appointee 
cohort or era. 
109. Not everyone who prevails in a bond hearing is ultimately released. Some lack the 
financial ability to pay bond. 
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highest win rates; they granted a favorable outcome for the 
noncitizen—release, set a bond for the first time if ICE denied bond, 
or lower the bond amount—in 45% and 43%, respectively, of their 
custody hearings. Trump appointees were less likely than Obama-
appointed IJs overall to grant relief; they did so only 38% of the time, 
a result statistically significant at 95% confidence. But they were not 
the least likely to grant relief among appointee cohorts across the time 
frame of the study: IJs appointed by Reagan were less likely to grant 
relief (32%) to the requesting noncitizen to a statistically significant 
degree. One possible explanation for this trend would be if ICE 
enforcement officers set lower bond amounts in the first instance 
during the earlier years, and higher initial bond amounts more recently. 
FIGURE 1:WIN RATES, BY APPOINTEE COHORT
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At the opposite end of the spectrum, we look at the likelihood of 
denying bond outright. Again, both Trump appointees and Obama 
appointees were far harsher to noncitizens than any other group of 
appointees. Across all eras, about 15% of cases decided by Trump 
appointees and 17% by Obama appointees resulted in no bond being 
issued at all, as compared to 12% for IJs appointed by the four other 
presidents in the study, a result statistically significant at 95% 
confidence. These findings are reflected in Figure 2.  
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FIGURE 2:NO BOND DECISIONS, BY APPOINTEE COHORT
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These findings suggest that IJs appointed by Trump are among the 
strictest in their decision-making compared to IJs appointed by earlier 
presidents. Perhaps surprisingly, Obama appointees are comparably 
strict, at least in terms of the rates at which they granted release and 
the rates at which they denied bond altogether. 
2. Differences Across Presidential Eras. Next we look at 
differences in bond outcomes across different presidential eras for all 
appointees, reflected in Table 2. Were IJs as a whole—regardless of 
who appointed them—less likely to grant relief to noncitizens during 
the Trump Era than prior eras? This analysis offers descriptive 
information on the extent to which a presidential administration could 
potentially influence IJs through the power to supervise. 
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TABLE 2: CUSTODY HEARING OUTCOMES AND WIN RATES,
BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
Trump Era Obama Era Bush II Era 
Release 0.17 0.23 1.74 
Lower $ 39.70 43.20 38.60 
Win Rate 39.88 43.43 40.34 
Higher $ 1.26 2.10 3.61 
No Action 34.01 30.70 30.30 
No Change 6.67 9.70 18.31 
No Bond 18.19 14.07 7.44 
Loss Rate 60.12 56.57 59.66 
Interestingly, overall win rates were lower to a statistically 
significant degree during the Trump Era (40%) than during the Obama 
Era (43%). The overall win rates by presidential era are reflected in 
Figure 3. But rates of release from recognizance were considerably 
lower during both the Trump and Obama Eras (0.17% and 0.23%, 
respectively) as compared to the Bush II Era (2%), a result statistically 
significant at 95% confidence in the bivariate analysis. 
FIGURE 3:WIN RATES, BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
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Similarly, in terms of the percentage of cases that resulted in bond 
being denied outright, noncitizens fared worse as time progressed. 
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Only 7% of custody hearings resulted in a denial of bond during the 
Bush II Era, rising to 14% during the Obama Era and to 18% during 
the Trump Era. These results are reflected in Figure 4.
FIGURE 4:NO BOND DECISIONS, BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
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3. Differences Across Presidential Eras and Appointees. Finally, 
and most importantly, we examine how different cohorts of appointees 
behaved during different eras. These data are reflected in Table 3. 
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TABLE 3: CUSTODY HEARING OUTCOME AND WIN RATES,
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA
Trump Obama Bush II Clinton Bush I Reagan 
App. App. App. App. App. App. 
Trump Era 
Release 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.48 0.10 0.23 
Lower $ 37.62 43.17 39.55 33.70 11.76 20.90 
Win Rate 37.74 43.30 39.68 34.18 11.86 21.13 
Higher $ 0.98 1.45 1.16 1.17 0.87 0.83 
No Action 39.16 30.70 33.41 38.73 55.93 27.08 
No Change 7.10 5.73 6.60 5.76 2.80 41.39 
No Bond 15.03 18.82 19.16 20.16 28.54 9.57 
Loss Rate 62.26 56.70 60.32 65.82 88.14 78.87 
Obama Era 
Release — 0.13 0.14 0.40 0.39 0.14 
Lower $ — 45.53 44.69 42.36 41.34 31.79 
Win Rate — 45.65 44.83 42.75 41.73 31.93 
Higher $ — 2.23 2.44 1.80 1.89 1.83 
No Action — 30.30 28.72 31.56 33.76 33.98 
No Change — 6.82 11.32 8.29 13.26 23.08 
No Bond — 15.01 12.69 15.59 9.36 9.17 
Loss Rate — 54.35 55.17 57.25 58.27 68.07 
Bush Era 
Release — — 0.56 2.18 1.41 1.48 
Lower $ — — 34.22 42.56 34.98 31.53 
Win Rate — — 34.79 44.74 36.39 33.01 
Higher $ — — 3.64 3.64 3.17 3.69 
No Action — — 29.28 28.31 33.72 35.66 
No Change — — 24.12 16.68 16.26 19.63 
No Bond — — 8.17 6.65 10.46 8.01 
Loss Rate — — 65.21 55.26 63.61 66.99 
During the Trump Era, Obama appointees issued more favorable 
bond decisions to noncitizen detainees than any other group of 
appointees. They granted relief to noncitizens in 43% of cases, as 
compared to the 37% win rate for IJs appointed by any other president 
ruling during the Trump Era, a result statistically significant at 95% 
confidence. Trump and Bush II appointees also had higher win rates 
(38% and 40%, respectively) for noncitizens during this era than 
appointees of all other presidents besides Obama. Surprisingly, then, it 
was the earlier-appointed cohorts—those appointed by Clinton, Bush 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
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I, and Reagan—who exhibited the lowest win rates during the Trump 
Era. These discrepancies could be explained by the higher percent of 
“no action” or “no change” decisions by Bush I and Reagan appointees 
in particular. 
Moreover, many of these same earlier appointees were far more 
sympathetic to noncitizens during the preceding eras than during the 
Trump Era. For example, IJs appointed by Clinton granted relief to 
noncitizens in 34% of the cases they heard during the Trump Era, but 
in 44% of cases in prior years, a result statistically significant at 95% 
confidence. Even more stark, Bush I appointees granted relief to 
detainees in only 12% of cases during the Trump Era even though they 
granted such relief in 39% of cases in prior years, again a statistically 
significant result. Reagan appointees had a statistically significant win 
rate of 21% during the Trump Era compared to 33% prior. Bush II 
appointees are the exception to this trend; although Bush II appointees 
had a lower win rate during the Obama Era than the Trump Era (45% 
during Trump Era versus 40% during Obama Era), they had their 
lowest win rate during the Bush II Era (35%). These findings, showing 
changes in behavior during different presidential eras amongst the 
same cohort of judges, suggest that it is possible the Trump 
administration could be exercising some influence over IJs through its 
supervisory authority. These findings are reflected in Figure 5. 
FIGURE 5: WIN RATES, BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA 
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C. Bond Amounts Set by IJs 
Next, we examine changes in the bond amounts set by IJs. As an 
initial matter, we analyze median bond amounts by appointee cohort 
and presidential era.110 These data are reflected in Table 4.
TABLE 4:MEDIAN BOND AMOUNTS,
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA 
All  Trump Obama Bush II Clinton Bush I Reagan 
App. App. App. App. App. App. App. 
Trump Era $8,000 $10,000 $7,500 $10,000 $7,500 $10,000 $10,250 
Obama Era $6,500 — $7,000 $7,000 $5,000 $5,000 $8,000 
Bush II Era $5,000 — — $7,000 $5,000 $7,500 $5,000 
All Eras $7,000 $10,000 $7,500 $7,500 $5,000 $6,500 $7,500 
Bond medians grew throughout the three eras in our study, 
starting at $5,000 during the Bush Era, rising to $6,500 during the 
Obama Era, then jumping to $8,000 during the Trump Era. Trump 
appointees have had a median bond amount of $10,000, but all the 
appointee cohorts exhibited a higher median bond amount during the 
Trump Era than either the Obama or Bush II Eras. IJs appointed by 
Bush II, for example, set a median bond amount of $7,000 during the 
Bush II and Obama Eras; this amount jumped to $10,000 during the 
Trump Era. The biggest jump occurred for Bush I appointees—$5,000 
during the Obama Era to $10,000 during the Trump Era. These 
findings suggest that although bond amounts grew overall as time 
passed, they grew at a faster rate under the Trump administration.111 
Data for the rates at which IJs set low, medium, or high bond amounts 
are set forth in Table 5. 
110. We used median bond amount rather than mean bond amount because the median is less 
affected by IJs who may issue bond amounts in the extreme. We excluded IJ bond amounts when 
the bond decision was “no bond” or release on own recognizance as erroneously coded. Trends 
are similar using the original, nonimputed data with missing values. 
111. These changes do not account for changes in inflation over the nearly twenty-year period 
of study, nor do they account for shifts in the bond amounts initially set by enforcement officials 
across time and region. These factors would contribute to the general tendency for bond to 
increase over time, but that would not necessarily negate political influence as a potential 
contributory factor in the overall trend of higher bond amounts. 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
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Looking only at differences between cohorts of appointees, 
reflected in the top section of Table 5 and Figure 6, we see that Trump 
appointees were more likely than appointees from other cohorts to set 
a bond of $10,000 or more (“high bond”). Across the entire period of 
study, about 53% of the bond decisions by Trump appointees, as 
compared to 30% for Obama appointees and 28% Bush II appointees, 
resulted in high bonds. The inverse was also true to some extent: 
Trump appointees were less likely to set bond at $2,500 or lower (“low 
bond”) than Obama appointees, for example (2% versus 3% overall). 
TABLE 5: BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES,
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA 
All  Trump Obama Bush II Clinton Bush I Reagan 
App. App. App. App. App. App. App.
All Eras 
$2,500 & Lower 4.85 1.59 3.17 4.24 7.13 4.60 3.96 
$2,501-$9,999 66.87 45.31 66.52 67.74 69.83 61.19 68.05 
$10,000 & Higher 28.27 53.10 30.31 28.02 23.03 34.20 27.99 
Trump Era 
$2,500 & Lower 2.37 1.59 2.71 1.88 3.28 1.36 0.33 
$2,501-$9,999 54.81 45.31 62.01 42.11 65.00 20.33 14.05 
$10,000 & Higher 42.82 53.10 35.28 56.00 31.72 78.31 85.62 
Obama Era 
$2,500 & Lower 4.78 — 3.48 4.54 6.83 3.78 2.22 
$2,501-$9,999 71.36 — 69.56 73.51 73.21 61.58 67.85 
$10,000 & Higher 23.87 — 26.96 21.96 19.96 34.64 29.93 
Bush II Era 
$2,500 & Lower 6.92 — — 5.19 8.12 5.44 5.32 
$2,501-$9,999 68.29 — — 70.54 67.21 62.99 71.81 
$10,000 & Higher 24.79 — — 24.27 24.67 31.57 22.87 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
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FIGURE 6: BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES, BY APPOINTEE COHORT
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Next, we examine differences in bond amounts across presidential 
eras. These data are reflected in Figure 7. Consistent with the findings 
on median bond amounts, we find that high bonds were more frequent 
during the Trump Era than the preceding eras. About 43% of bonds 
set by IJs during the Trump Era were $10,000 or more, as compared to 
only 24% for Obama Era and 25% for the Bush II Era. Conversely, the 
percentage of cases in which a low bond was set declined through the 
three presidential eras to a statistically significant degree, constituting 
7% of cases during the Bush II Era, 5% of cases during the Obama 
Era, and 2% of cases during the Trump Era.
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FIGURE 7: BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES, BY PRESIDENTIAL ERA
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We then examine high bond amounts and low bond amounts by 
appointee cohorts across the three presidential eras. These data are 
presented in Figures 8 and 9.
FIGURE 8:HIGH BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES ($10,000 AND HIGHER),
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA 
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FIGURE 9: LOW BOND AMOUNT PERCENTAGES ($2,500 AND LOWER), 
BY APPOINTEE COHORT AND PRESIDENTIAL ERA 
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Most appointee cohorts were more likely to issue a high bond 
amount during the Trump Era than during the preceding two 
administrations. Bush II appointees, for example, set a bond of $10,000 
or higher in only 24% of cases during the Bush II Era, declining slightly 
to 22% of cases during the Obama Era, and jumping to 56% of cases 
during the Trump Era, a difference statistically significant at 95% 
confidence. Interestingly, during the Trump Era, Bush II, Bush I, and 
Reagan appointees were even more likely to issue a high bond amount 
than Trump appointees during the same time frame. These findings 
show that bond amounts set by IJs have risen considerably during the 
Trump administration, and all cohorts of judges have behaved more 
harshly during the Trump Era than during prior eras. 
*? ? ? *? ? ? * 
Our descriptive findings show that along every metric of bond 
hearings, noncitizens appear to have fared considerably worse during 
the Trump Era than they did during either the Obama or Bush II Eras. 
Perhaps most telling, overall win rates indicate that all appointee 
cohorts were less likely to award relief to the noncitizen during the 
Trump Era than during the Obama Era. Although the analysis does 
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not control for other factors that could mitigate the impact of 
presidential influence, these results raise the question of whether the 
Trump administration is influencing IJ decision-making in bond 
decisions through its power to supervise earlier appointees. 
An examination of bond amounts set by IJs reveals a similar 
picture. Without controlling for inflation or initial amounts set by ICE, 
bond medians grew from $5,000 during the Bush II Era to $6,500 
during the Obama Era, and then jumped to $8,000 during the Trump 
Era. Indeed, 43% of the bonds set by IJs during the Trump Era were 
$10,000 or higher, as compared to only 24% and 25% for the Obama 
and Bush II Eras, respectively—differences that are statistically 
significant. Again, breaking down these results by appointee cohort 
and era indicates that earlier-appointed IJs have behaved more harshly 
during the Trump Era than during preceding administrations. 
III. MAPPING FUTURE RESEARCH
In the preceding section, our analysis suggested that immigration 
bond decisions may be shaped in part by a sitting president’s political 
agenda. This Part identifies two directions for future research. First, it 
proposes further study to determine whether our findings remain 
robust after controlling for other factors that otherwise impact 
immigrant custody decisions. Second, it encourages a renewed 
exploration of which factors should shape these decisions. 
A. Controlling for Potentially Confounding Variables
Our assessment of the role of presidential politics in individual 
immigrant custody decisions employs simple bivariate analyses and 
does not control for the myriad of other factors that may influence such 
decisions. A predictive study seeking to isolate and measure the role 
that political superiors play in immigrant detention outcomes would 
need to control for a wide variety of factors, including the legal factors 
that IJs are instructed to consider, as well as extralegal factors that may 
be shaping decision-making without legal grounds. 
To evaluate whether detention decisions are a product of political 
influence rather than, for example, legally relevant factors relating to a 
noncitizen’s dangerousness or flight risk, one would need to see 
whether our findings remain robust after controlling for variables such 
as the noncitizen’s family ties, length of U.S. residence, employment 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
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background, financial situation, and criminal history.112 EOIR 
currently does not reliably code for these factors, but prior studies
indicate at least some of these variables may be statistically significant 
predictors of IJs’ custody decisions.113 Such a study would also need to 
control for factors that are not legally relevant but may nonetheless 
influence IJs’ custody decisions.114 For example, Eagly and Shafer have 
found that attorney representation plays a significant role in 
determining whether a noncitizen remains detained or not.115 Ryo has 
found that the noncitizen’s national origin was a significant predictor 
of detention decisions.116 Outside of the detention context, scholars, 
including the authors, have identified other variables that have a 
statistically significant effect in predicting immigration decisions, 
including (1) factors related to the noncitizen, including not only 
attorney representation and national origin, but also criminal history, 
language, continent of origin, and whether the noncitizen arrived from 
a politically intolerant or poor country; (2) factors related to the IJ, 
such as gender, prior work experience, or tenure on the bench; (3) 
factors related to the base city of the hearing, including whether the 
case was heard at a large base city, whether the base city was located 
at the Southern Border, and the base city’s political and economic 
climate; and (4) factors related to other institutional actors such as 
Congress, the circuit courts, and the BIA.117 Although the immigrant-
 112. See In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (providing a nonexhaustive list of 
factors that may be considered by IJs in rendering custody decisions), abrogated on other grounds 
by Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 113. See Ryo, A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, supra note 38, at 119 (finding a 
noncitizen’s criminal history to be statistically significant in predicting immigrant detention 
decisions). 
 114. See Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 596–600 (citing scholarship identifying factors that 
predict immigration removal decisions). 
115. Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70 (finding that noncitizens represented by counsel are 
almost seven times more likely to be released than pro se counterparts); see also Ryo, A Study of 
Immigration Bond Hearings, supra note 38, at 143 (finding presence of counsel to be a statistically 
significant predictor of IJ custody decisions).
 116. Ryo, Predicting Danger, supra note 38, at 239 (finding, in a sample of immigrant 
detention decisions from 2013 to 2015, that Central Americans were 68% more likely to be 
detained because they pose a danger to the community than those from countries in other 
regions); see also Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case 
Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 
19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 450–51, 505–15 (1992) (describing deficiencies in 
language translation in immigration courts).
 117. See, e.g., BANKS MILLER, LINDA CAMP KEITH & JENNIFER S. HOLMES, IMMIGRATION 
JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 99 tbl.4.2, 100 (2014) (analyzing factors); Daniel E. Chand, 
William D. Schreckhise & Marianne L. Bowers, The Dynamics of State and Local Contexts and 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
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detention context differs from the criminal pretrial-detention context 
in important respects,118 scholarship examining the factors that play a 
role in a judge’s decision to release a criminal defendant from pretrial 
detention provide useful guidance as well. Criminal justice scholars 
have found, for example, that bond decisions vary based on factors 
such as caseload pressures119 and the availability of bed space in 
detention facilities.120 
Changes in bond decision-making may also result from factors 
entirely exogenous to the immigration courts, such as shifts in 
migration patterns. For example, prior to 2014, the majority of 
noncitizens in detention were from Mexico; the years since have 
witnessed a surge in detainees seeking asylum from the “Northern 
Triangle” countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
Similarly, the behavior of ICE enforcement officials may shift IJ 
custody decisions. For instance, in the past, ICE set uniformly high 
Immigration Asylum Hearing Decisions, 2017 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 182, 182, 188–89, 
188 fig.1, 193 tbl.5. (same); Linda Camp Keith, Jennifer S. Holmes & Banks P. Miller, Explaining 
the Divergence in Asylum Grant Rates Among Immigration Judges: An Attitudinal and Cognitive 
Approach, 35 L. & POL’Y 261, 278–80, 279 fig.1 (2013) (same); Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 
628–29 (same); Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 
957, 958 fig.5 (2015) (same); Eagly & Shafer, supra note 10, at 70 (same); Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication,
60 STAN.L.REV. 295, 342–49 (2007) (same); Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Measuring In Absentia 
Removal in Immigration Court, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (same); Daniel L. Chen & 
Jess Eagel, Can Machine Learning Help Predict the Outcome of Asylum Adjudications? 1, 6 tbl.3 
(Proceedings of the Ass’n for Computing Mach. Conference on Artificial Intelligence & the Law, 
Working Paper, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2815876 
[https://perma.cc/4JW9-AE4R]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM:
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS 
AND JUDGES 7, 36, 119, 120 tbl.19, 121 tbl.20, 123–24 (2008) (same), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY7J-FD5T]; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-72, supra note 49, at 62 tbl.10, 63 tbl.11 (2016) (same).
 118. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 206–09 (identifying important differences between pretrial 
criminal detention and detention pending immigration removal proceedings). 
119. Katherine Hood & Daniel Schneider, Bail and Pretrial Detention: Contours and Causes 
of Temporal and County Variation, 5 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 126, 129–30 (2019) 
(discussing studies suggesting that caseload pressure shapes pretrial decisions in criminal 
proceedings (citing Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel 
Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2004) and Brian Johnson, Contextual Disparities in Guidelines 
Departures: Courtroom Social Contexts, Guidelines Compliance, and Extralegal Disparities in 
Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2005))). 
 120. Id. at 130 (citing ROY B. FLEMMING, PUNISHMENT BEFORE TRIAL: AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON FELONY BAIL PROCESSES (1982)).
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bond rates for women detained in particular facilities.121 Those high 
bond amounts may have had an anchoring effect on the IJs’ subsequent 
review of the bond amount. Changes in ICE enforcement patterns may 
also impact the types of cases IJs hear. For example, cases decided 
during the Obama administration, which sought to prioritize the 
removal of criminal noncitizens,122 would likely have had a higher 
proportion of such noncitizens in the pool of immigrants seeking bond 
hearings. By contrast, we might expect to see a lower proportion of 
criminal noncitizens in bond hearings during the Trump administration 
given its policy of enforcement against all noncitizens who may be 
removable.123 Nor can we reliably code for whether the noncitizen has 
a criminal record or how such a record would affect outcomes.124 These 
case-selection effects could alter custody outcomes even if IJs—as 
opposed to enforcement officials—were entirely independent from 
their political superiors in the administration. 
Changes in caseload volume could also impact custody 
determinations, as IJs may have less time for individualized 
considerations of the legally relevant factors and default to categorical 
thinking based on their own predilections and policy preferences or 
those of their political superiors. As of October 2019, according to the 
EOIR, there were over 980,000 cases pending on the courts’ dockets, 
up from 430,000 in 2014.125 
Future research should determine whether the findings reported 
above remain robust after controlling for these other variables that 
likely have an independent effect on immigrant custody decisions. Such 
research would then move closer to identifying and measuring the 
extent to which IJs’ custody decisions are a function of a given 
 121. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 211 (identifying FOIA records to show that “DHS sets the 
same bond amounts for all individuals in custody at a particular detention facility or in a particular 
region during a specific time period”). 
 122. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 39 (prioritizing the removal of 
criminal noncitizens and those apprehended at the border). 
 123. See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8800 (Jan. 30, 2017) (stating the policy of 
enforcing immigration laws “against all removable aliens”). 
124. Kim & Semet, supra note 32, at 619–20 (“[Whether] the noncitizen was charged under 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)—listing crime-based grounds for inadmissibility and 
deportability, respectively—would not reliably indicate whether the noncitizen had a criminal 
background.”). ICE prosecutors typically charge noncitizens with the ground or grounds that are 
easiest to prove, not necessarily the most serious ground for removal. Id. at 620. 
 125. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS: PENDING 
CASES (2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1060836/download [https://perma.cc/9UBP-
Z3AB]. 
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president’s political agenda rather than an independent assessment of 
record evidence. 
B. The Search for Factors that Should Determine Immigrant 
Detention 
A second avenue for future research would be to identify the 
factors that should be used in immigrant custody hearings. Such 
findings could produce fairer and more accurate detention decisions. 
They would also aid the government’s efforts to establish a “risk 
classification assessment” to systematize the factors IJs would use in 
determining whether a noncitizen will be detained.126 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has authorized the detention 
of noncitizens pending removal proceedings on two grounds only: to 
protect the community from danger—public safety127—and to ensure 
the noncitizen’s appearance at further removal proceedings—flight 
risk.128 It has emphasized, however, that detention may not be used as 
punishment.129 
As an initial matter, deterring future migrants, in our view, should 
play no role in immigrant custody decisions. Deterrence is a rationale 
for penological incarceration; it cannot be a ground for detention 
pending removal. But presidential administrations have periodically 
defended immigrant detention precisely on such grounds, asserting 
that such detention is necessary to deter others from seeking to enter 
the United States.130 The District Court for the District of Columbia 
 126. Cf. Noferi & Koulish, supra note 89, at 58–72 (criticizing the current assessment tool for 
failing to accurately predict bail risks). We recognize that in the criminal pretrial-detention 
context, such assessments have been shown to perpetuate structural bias and inequality. Sandra 
G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2296–97 (2019). Nonetheless, such assessments 
could be used to provide additional support for, rather than additional detention of, individuals 
found to be high risk. Id. at 2225–26, 2286–93.
127. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541, 544 (1952) (sustaining the detention of Communist 
noncitizens pending deportation proceedings for public-safety reasons). 
128. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003) (sustaining mandatory detention on the 
ground that it “necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from 
fleeing prior to or during their removal proceedings”). 
129. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, 237–38 (1896) (holding that although 
detention is a valid action in enforcing immigration laws, noncitizens cannot be subjected to 
punishment such as hard labor or confiscation of property without a judicial trial establishing 
guilt).
 130. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 238–40 (2019) 
(tracing the history of administrations’ use of immigrant detention to deter migration); Julia 
Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-largest-immigration-
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has cast doubt on such reasoning, rejecting the notion that “one 
particular individual may be civilly detained for the sake of sending a 
message of deterrence to other Central American individuals who may 
be considering immigration” as “out of line with analogous Supreme 
Court decisions” reserving deterrence goals for the criminal justice 
system.131 
Additionally, from a normative perspective, one should question 
whether concerns that the noncitizen would endanger public safety if 
released constitute a valid ground for detention pending removal 
proceedings. Unlike in the criminal pretrial context, noncitizens in 
removal proceedings need not have been accused of any crime at all— 
they may simply be removable because they overstayed a visa, for 
example. Even for those who are removable on the basis of criminal 
conduct, detention pending the outcome of removal proceedings 
generally occurs only after the noncitizen has already served the full 
criminal sentence deemed appropriate for the crime.132 Detaining them 
further due to their immigration status under these circumstances 
begins to look punitive. 
Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Carlson v. Landon133 is 
instructive in this regard. In that case, noncitizens were charged with 
removal on the basis of their membership in the Communist Party.134 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court sustained their detention for the 
purpose of preventing them from “aid[ing] in carrying out the 
objectives of the world communist movement.”135 Justice Black 
dissented, reasoning, “Since it is not necessary to keep them in jail to 
assure their compliance with a deportation order, their imprisonment 
cannot possibly be intended as an aid to deportation. . . . A power to 
put in jail because dangerous cannot be derived from a power to 
deport.”136 Justice Black would have permitted immigrant detention 
only for the purpose of effectuating removal.137 For him—and for us— 
detention-center-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/C7KJ-NYWN] (describing the Obama 
administration policy of using family detention as a deterrent).
131. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 188–89 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Aracely v. Nielsen, 
319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2018) (rejecting the deterrence rationale for immigrant 
detention).
 132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2018) (directing that noncitizens convicted of specified crimes be 
taken into immigration custody “when the alien is released” from criminal custody). 
133. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
 134. Id. at 528–29. 
 135. Id. at 544. 
 136. Id. at 551 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id.
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immigrant detention to prevent crimes impermissibly reaches beyond 
the core justification for the confinement of noncitizens in this context: 
to facilitate their deportation. 
As for the detention of individuals for the purpose of ensuring 
their appearance for removal proceedings, IJs currently may consider 
the noncitizen’s length of residence in the United States, family ties, 
employment background, and prior efforts to abscond from law 
enforcement.138 But none of these factors have been empirically shown 
to predict the likelihood that a noncitizen will appear for removal 
proceedings.139 
It is worth noting here that the necessity of using detention at all, 
at least in the vast majority of cases, remains unclear. Although it is 
true that detaining a noncitizen guarantees his or her later appearance, 
recent scholarship shows that noncitizens’ appearance rate is high even 
without detention. For example, scholars found that 96% of families 
seeking asylum attended all of their hearings after being released from 
detention.140 Other mechanisms such as electronic monitoring and 
periodic check-in requirements may also be effective in increasing the 
likelihood of appearance in immigration court.141 The danger of 
erroneously detaining someone absent a flight risk is particularly acute 
in the immigration context, where a noncitizen with a valid claim to 
remain in the United States might opt to abandon that claim simply to 
end the period of detention. 
It is also possible that additional factors should be considered in 
assessing flight risk. For example, a noncitizen’s likelihood of 
ultimately obtaining relief from removal may be relevant in calculating 
flight risk. It stands to reason that if a noncitizen has no colorable claim 
to relief from removal, then he or she is more likely to abscond to avoid 
inevitable removal. By contrast, a noncitizen with a strong claim to 
relief from removal is likely to attend removal proceedings that will 
lead to lawful presence in the United States. Indeed, the current 
 138. In re Guerra, 24 I. &N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors 
that may be considered by IJs in rendering custody decisions), abrogated on other grounds by
Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684 (D. Mass. 2018).
 139. See Gilman, supra note 90, at 206 (“No empirical research has taken place to identify 
factors that accurately predict the risk of flight or danger presented by a migrant in deportation 
proceedings.”). 
140. Eagly et al., supra note 11, at 848. 
 141. AUDREY SINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45804, IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES 
TO DETENTION (ATD) PROGRAMS 7–9 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45804.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TZZ4-W46F]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-26, supra note 18, 
at 8–10, 30. 
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system, which does not generally consider likelihood of ultimate 
relief,142 creates a perversion in the immigrant detention system. Those 
with the strongest legal claims to remain in the United States are the 
ones most likely to remain detained. An individual with a weak legal 
claim may well decide to abandon it in the face of detention, but 
individuals would likely tolerate lengthy detentions in oppressive 
conditions if they truly and reasonably feared persecution if 
repatriated, for example. 
Another factor that might be considered is the noncitizen’s ability 
to pay a bond amount. Policies that impose the same bond amount on 
entire categories of noncitizens make little sense because a wealthier 
noncitizen may be able to post the bond amount easily and care little 
for losing the bond if he or she absconds, while a poorer noncitizen may 
be detained simply because of his or her inability to pay.143 Pursuant to 
a class action lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit, IJs in that circuit—but only 
that circuit—are required to consider ability to pay in setting bond 
amounts.144 
Our findings on the relationship between presidential 
administrations and outcomes in individual detention decisions suggest 
that future research is warranted to further identify the factors that 
shape IJs’ detention decisions, as well as the factors that should shape 
such decisions. 
CONCLUSION
The prospect of politicized custody decisions challenges the very 
core of our notions of due process. Even those who view the ultimate 
decision to deport noncitizens as being vested exclusively in the 
political branches should chafe at the suggestion that the decision of 
 142. Cf. In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40 (omitting the likelihood of ultimate relief in a list 
of factors to consider in determining immigrant custody but noting the list is nonexhaustive). But 
see United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Dir. of Immigration & Naturalization, 169 F.2d 747, 751 
(2d Cir. 1948) (identifying the likelihood of ultimate removal as a permissible factor in immigrant 
detention decisions).
143. ACLU Analytics & Immigrants’ Rights Project, Discretionary Detention by the Numbers, 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/discretionary-
detention [https://perma.cc/6BLU-ZUC6] (showing rates at which noncitizens remain detained 
due to inability to post bond amount). 
 144. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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whom to detain—for spans of months or even years—should be 
directed by an individual president’s political agenda.145 
There may be some role, however, for executive branch political 
officials, at least under the current system in which IJs are housed in 
the executive branch.146 Political supervisors might legitimately act to 
reduce arbitrariness and disparities in custody decisions. After all, such 
disparities arguably compromise rule-of-law norms. Political actors 
within the executive branch might properly engage in notice-and-
comment rulemaking to promulgate regulations specifying the types of 
factors IJs should consider in their detention decisions. Alternatively, 
the Attorney General might identify such factors through his or her 
power to refer BIA cases to himself or herself and formally review 
them.147 Where such actions do not exceed statutory bounds and do not 
compromise individual due process interests, they may legitimately 
limit the adjudicatory discretion of IJs. 
By contrast, efforts by the president, the Attorney General, or any 
other political subordinates to sway IJ decisions by simply directing IJs 
to detain more immigrants or set uniformly high bond amounts would 
raise due process concerns. They would also result in the pointless 
expenditure of considerable funds to detain someone who poses little-
 145. Cf. Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the 
Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 KAN. L. REV. 541, 541 (2011) (arguing that the lack of 
decisional independence among IJs “only scratches the surface” of the many problems associated 
with immigration court adjudication). 
146. A growing number of scholars and organizations have endorsed moving immigration 
proceedings into a new Article I court. See  AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, 2019
UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE 
INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF 
REMOVAL CASES, at UD 6–14 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_immigration_system_volume_2. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/7GVT-BY72] (endorsing the creation of an Article I court to handle 
removal adjudication); Jill Family, Injecting Independence and Proportionality into Immigration 
Adjudication, inAM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, RETHINKING ADMIN LAW: FROM APA TO Z 45, 49
(2019), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Rethinking-Admin-Law-From-APA-to-
Z.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND7K-S4X5] (same); Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n, Statement of the 
American Immigration Lawyers Association Submitted to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Border Security and Immigration Hearing on “Strengthening and Reforming America’s 
Immigration Court System” 1–2 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-
correspondence/2018/aila-statement-on-strengthening-and-reforming [https://perma.cc/7EMZ-
NW85] (same); Article I Immigration Court: Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration 
Court, FED. BAR ASS’N, https://www.fedbar.org/government-relations/policy-priorities/article-i-
immigration-court [https://perma.cc/YBB4-UC64] (same). Stephen Legomsky has proposed an 
alternative structural reform, creating a new, independent Article III immigration court. Stephen 
H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1686–87 (2010). 
147. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2019). 
???? ????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????? ?????????????????
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 1900 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1855?
to-no flight risk. A solution to mitigating decisional disparities that opts 
to uniformly deny bond or consistently set unrealistically high bond 
amounts, without any individualized assessment of the person’s flight 
risk or dangerousness, raises significant due process concerns. A better 
approach would be to impose stronger guidelines on the factors that 
should be considered in determining whether the noncitizen should be 
detained or released. Uniformity need not bend toward more 
detention. 
*? ? ? *? ? ? * 
APPENDIX
The data for this Article is available to the public on EOIR’s 
website.148 EOIR maintains an electronic case-management system of 
its data.149 EOIR also publishes a “Lookup File” that describes the 
codes used in its documents. Each EOIR case has a case number 
(labeled “idncase”) with potentially multiple proceeding numbers 
(“idnproceeding”). To determine the bond decision, we relied on the 
 148. See supra note 42. We primarily used the “D_TblAssociatedBond” file (“Bond Table”) 
as the base table. We then merged in additional CSV files, including: (1) the “[T]bl_[S]chedule” 
file (“Schedule Table”) to determine hearing-level information; (2) the “A_TblCase” (“Case 
Table”) to identify information on case type and custody status; (3) the “B_TblProceeding” file 
(“Proceeding Table”) to identify information on case type and custody status; (4) the 
“[T]bl_[L]ead/[R]ider” file (“Lead/Rider Table”) to discern case IDs for the cases that were leads 
and riders indicating family units; (5) the “[T]bl_CustodyHistory” file (“Custody Table”) to see 
custody status and dates; and (6) the “[T]bl_JuvenileHistory” file (“Juvenile Table”) to identify 
juvenile cases. 
149. Prior to 2007, this system was called the “Automated Nationwide System for 
Immigration Review” (“ANSIR”), and after, the system was updated to the “Case Access System 
for EOIR” (“CASE”). See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE,U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRATION COURTS AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION 
APPEALS 2 n.2, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/include/08-EOIR_asylum_disparity_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFJ8-7RTA] (explaining the then-upcoming switch from ANSIR to 
CASE in fiscal year 2007). This change in reporting impacted our dataset since some information 
was not consistently coded throughout the time of study. In addition, TRAC has noted significant 
discrepancies in the data EOIR releases to the public. See Incomplete and Garbled Immigration 
Court Data Suggest Lack of Commitment to Accuracy, TRAC (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/580 [https://perma.cc/W7BX-T9TK]. EOIR has 
responded that it has no duty under FOIA to “certify” the accuracy of its records. Id. The GAO 
has launched an investigation. GAO To Probe Missing DOJ Immigration Records, LAW360 (Mar. 
4, 2020), https://www.law360.com/immigration/articles/1238391/gao-to-probe-missing-doj-
immigration-records [https://perma.cc/2454-3PSP]. By necessity, our analysis is limited to the 
extent any information provided by EOIR is incomplete or inaccurate. We relied on the files 
released in October 2019, February 2020, and March 2020 to complete this analysis. 
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variable “dec” in the “Bond Table.”150 We narrowed the dataset in a 
few ways. First, we included only the first substantive bond decision.151 
Second, we included only bond hearings that occurred in the context 
of removal proceedings, deleting the 1% of cases that were associated 
with nonremoval cases. Third, we eliminated the cases in which the IJ 
concluded that they lacked jurisdiction. A lack of jurisdiction would 
occur where the noncitizen was ineligible for release because they were 
subject to mandatory detention statutes. If there was more than one 
hearing and if the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction during the first 
hearing, we used the next hearing in which there was a substantive 
bond decision, provided the decision was after January 19, 2001. 
Fourth, we deleted custody cases heard by Carter and Nixon 
appointees to simplify the analysis. Fifth, we eliminated all proceedings 
heard by IJs who decided less than fifty bond proceedings. We also 
eliminated proceedings heard by an individual who had not yet been 
formally appointed as an IJ, as well as those heard by IJs for whom we 
were not able to obtain reliable biographical information. Sixth, we 
eliminated proceedings in which custody status was listed as “never 
detained.”152 It is possible that in those cases, the noncitizen had never 
150. Bond decisions are coded as follows in the EOIR database: (1) no action (“A”); (2) new 
amount (“C”); (3) “no jurisdiction” (“J”); (4) no bond (“N”); (5) own recognizance (“R”); or (6) 
no change (“S”). Data tables produced by EOIR in response to a FOIA request indicate that 
decisions coded as “G,” “D,” “O,” or “F” are not valid. Cases with these invalid codes mostly 
involved pre-2001 cases and any post-2001 cases with these codes were dropped. The Bond Table 
has thousands of entries lacking data on the presiding judge, base city, hearing location of the 
cases, and the completion date. To identify missing information, we merged in the Schedule Table, 
which codes “CY” or “Custody” to signify the custody proceeding. If the judge was still missing 
even after merging in the Schedule Table, we used the judge listed in the Proceeding Table if the 
date of the bond proceeding seemed consistent with the completion date of the removal 
proceeding. 
151. Prior to 2005, most bond hearings were coded as “BD” or “bond redeterminations” 
proceedings. After 2005, most proceedings were coded as “BB” or “custody redeterminations.”
See What Happens When Individuals Are Released on Bond in Immigration Court Proceedings?, 
TRAC IMMIGRATION (Sept. 14, 2016), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/438 [https:// 
perma.cc/XDA4-TMNM] (noting a shift in coding twenty years ago). We treated BB and BD 
bond type proceedings the same. “SB” proceedings indicate a subsequent bond hearing after one 
was already heard. Many of these subsequent cases were coded as bond type “SB.” However, we 
found that some cases were coded as “SB” even if they were the only bond proceeding for a given 
noncitizen, so this variable alone was not useful in identifying the first substantive case. Rather, 
the data had to be sorted by case and proceeding IDs, the bond completion date (“comp_date”), 
and the hearing time (“hearing_time”). If there were two bond hearings on the same day, we 
included the decision labeled as the “BB” or “BD” bond type proceeding as the first substantive 
case and considered the hearing labeled “SB” as the second substantive outcome.  
152. To identify custody cases, we relied on the Case Table as well as the Custody Table and 
Proceeding Table. Noncitizens coded as “N” were never detained, while those coded “R” or “D” 
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been detained but sought review over the conditions for their release; 
it is also possible that those cases were erroneously coded. Seventh, we 
eliminated cases coded as involving family units or juveniles on the 
ground that IJ decisions on bond will differ systematically in cases 
involving family units or juveniles.153 
The reliability of the data is unclear. If the bond amount was below 
the statutory minimum of $1,500, we made it $1,500. Most observations 
included a bond decision, but many did not record a bond amount. We 
found many internal inconsistencies in EOIR’s coding on the old and 
new bond amounts. For example, some cases coded as a “no bond” or 
“own recognizance” decision actually had an amount listed in the “new 
bond” column. We treated such decisions as no bond or own 
recognizance cases, opining that the “bond decision” variable was 
coded accurately. In addition, we imputed IJ bond amounts based on 
the bond decision. If the IJ bond amount was missing but the ICE bond 
amount was filled in with the decision being “no action” or “no 
change,” we imputed the ICE amount as the amount for new bond 
cases, and vice versa.154 If bond amounts were missing, it was unclear if 
the IJ sought to issue a lower or higher bond, or if the IJ set a bond 
amount for the first time if ICE had denied bond. We assumed that if 
the noncitizen was released, the IJ lowered bond. If the information for 
the initial ICE bond amount was still missing, we imputed the median 
ICE bond based on the court base city in which the hearing took place 
and the presidential era. For missing IJ bond amounts, we imputed the 
median amount set by that IJ for the presidential era. We did the 
imputations on the truncated dataset. The bond amounts presented 
were detained but released, or detained, respectively. Where the Custody Table included multiple 
entries, we compared the dates for the bond completion and the date released or detained. 
 153. See supra note 64. To identify juveniles, we relied on both the Juvenile Table and the 
Lead and Rider Tables. We assumed that rider cases involved juveniles. EOIR’s coding 
identifying juvenile cases is unclear, so we only eliminated the cases with a juvenile ID from the 
Juvenile Table (other than if coded “NA” or “Not Applicable”) or who had a case ID from either 
the Lead or Rider Tables. Some analysis has suggested this is underinclusive of all juveniles. See
NINA SIULC, ZHIFEN CHENG, ARNOLD SON & OLGA BYRNE, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL 
ORIENTATION PROGRAM: EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE AND OUTCOME MEASUREMENT 
REPORT, PHASE II, at 79 (2008), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/legal-orientation-
program-evaluation-and-performance-and-outcome-measurement-report-phase-ii/legacy_downloads
/LOP_evalution_updated_5-20-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z5B-PCV8]. We eliminated all rider 
cases as well as all lead cases that had a rider case, assuming that lead cases involved family units. 
154. The American Civil Liberties Union made this assumption. See ACLU, IMMIGRATION 
BOND ANALYSIS: METHODOLOGY 2, https://www.aclu.org/report/immigration-bond-analysis-
methodology [https://perma.cc/DW4E-R53K]. 
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exclude what we perceive to be erroneously coded bond amounts for 
no bond, own recognizance, or lack of jurisdiction outcomes. 
